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Josie Gill
‘Under extreme environmental pressure, characteristics
were acquired’: epigenetics, race and Salman Rushdie’s
The Satanic Verses
This article examines the role that literature might play in post-genomic
biology as it moves toward a complex, non-deterministic conception of
the gene. Epigenetics has overturned the notion of ‘the gene’ as discrete
entity with stable, determining effects. Instead, epigenetics reveals that
genes can change according to environmental circumstances and that
such changes can be passed on to offspring. This finding has far-reaching
implications for the concept of race. The effects of past environments – the
experience, for example, of slave ancestors – become embodied in health
disparities in the present, the genes carry a ‘memory’ of these experiences,
while creating new memories as they are affected by contemporary experi-
ences of racial inequality. This essay argues that literature can illuminate
our understanding of these emerging scientific insights. I explore how
Rushdie’s representation of the porous boundary between the body and
its wider environment in The Satanic Verses offers a mode of comprehend-
ing the epigenetic effects of racism as the imagined (racist belief in the
inferiority of other races) made real (in apparently ‘racial’ biological charac-
teristics), and how Rushdie’s interrogation of the relationship between the
imaginary and reality reveals how fiction might be brought to bear on the
science of epigenetics.
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Writing in 2005, five years after the mapping of the human genome, gen-
eticist Johnjoe McFadden noted that the idea that there are ‘genes for’
certain diseases and conditions was already beginning to crumble.
Systems biology, he argued, has revealed that ‘rather than having a single
major function, most genes . . . probably play a small part in lots of tasks
within the cell’.1 Genes can no longer be considered ‘discrete nuggets of
genetic information’ but are ‘diffuse entities whose functional reality
may be spread across hundreds of interacting DNA segments’.2 The com-
plexity of the system, in contrast to the reductionism of the gene-centric
biology that dominated the latter half of the twentieth century, is compar-
able, in McFadden’s view, to the ‘holistic approaches’ which have ‘always
dominated the humanities and social sciences’.3 He ends his article with
the following example:
The first eight chapters of Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children
describes the lives of the narrator’s grandparents, parents, aunts,
uncles and friends against the backdrop of the tumultuous politics
of 20th-century India and Pakistan. The reason, according to the
narrator, is that ‘to understand just one life, you have to swallow
the world’. Perhaps biologists ought to have read more.4
McFadden’s suggestion, that literature has already imagined the kinds of
complexity that biology is only now beginning to uncover, and that biol-
ogists might learn from literary ways of knowing the world, is a provocative
one. While literary scholars have increasingly argued that literature can
shed light on the workings of genetics, on ‘the gene as a conceptual
object disseminated by intellectual activity’5 or on ‘the nature of the
relationship between science and representation’,6 few, undoubtedly
wary of the historically fraught relations between the disciplines, have
suggested that literature might offer models and approaches which
science might look toward. Although McFadden’s call for biologists to
read more is perhaps made somewhat flippantly, in inviting the literary
into the realm of the biological, positioning it as a discipline of comparable
epistemological weight with the capacity (even when not addressing science
directly) to influence how genetics is conceptualised and understood,
McFadden’s article raises wider questions about the role that literature
might play in post-genomic biology as it moves toward a complex, non-
deterministic conception of the gene. If contemporary genetic discoveries
have been in some way previously conceived of in literature, then how
can literature guide understanding of these emerging scientific insights?
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This essay will offer some tentative answers to this far-reaching question
through an examination of an emergent strand of post-genomic biology –
epigenetics. Like the systems biology to which McFadden refers, epige-
netics – broadly defined as the study of changes in gene function and
expression that do not comprise changes in the DNA sequence – has over-
turned the notion of ‘the gene’ as discrete entity with stable, determining
effects. Instead, epigenetics is revealing that genes are plastic, that they can
change according to environmental circumstances, and that such changes
can be passed on to offspring, thus reconfiguring genetic inheritance and
development as fluid and complex, rather than fixed, processes. Of particu-
lar interest in this essay will be the implications of epigenetic processes for
the concept of race. I suggest that epigenetics, in demonstrating how the
effects of past environments can be manifested in health disparities in
the present through the inheritance of epigenetic marks, reasserts the sig-
nificance of the history of racism, as well as the contemporary lived experi-
ence of racial inequality. These are factors which are frequently dismissed
in contemporary accounts of race in science, which have instead tended to
posit race as being ambivalently ‘in-between’ the biological and the cul-
tural. Epigenetic science, I argue, reveals the pitfalls of such constructions
and offers a more productive mode of conceiving of the relationship
between race, biology and culture.
The essay then turns to consider the potential role of literature in
thinking through the implications of an epigenetic understanding of
race. The way experiences of racism become biologically embodied has
already been imagined in contemporary fiction: Salman Rushdie’s 1988
novel The Satanic Verses, invokes Lamarckian evolutionary theory (epige-
netics’ historical predecessor) as it imagines the acquisition of character-
istics through migration and the subsequent exposure to the racist
environment of England.7 Using The Satanic Verses as a case study, I
explore how Rushdie’s representation of the porous boundary between
the body and its wider environment not only offers a mode of compre-
hending the epigenetic effects of racism as the imagined or fictional
(racist belief in the inferiority of other races) made real (in apparently
‘racial’ biological characteristics), but in interrogating the dynamic
relationship between the imaginary and reality, The Satanic Verses reveals
how fiction itself might be brought to bear on the science of epigenetics.
It is a commonplace that the concept of race has been substantially
reconfigured by post-genomic biology. The mapping of the human
genome famously affirmed what Richard Lewontin had proposed in
1972; that the differences between humans within traditionally conceived
racial groups are greater than the differences between so-called races; that
race, as biological concept, has no meaning. Yet research on genetic vari-
ation between racial groups has continued since the completion of the
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Human Genome Project; population genetics, race-based medicine and
genetic ancestry tracing technologies all draw upon racial distinctions as
a means of examining genetic variations between populations. While
some scientists have noted the limitations of using race given its ‘unscien-
tific’ conceptual status,8 and critics have argued that the continuing use of
the concept of race risks a return to racial science,9 an opposing and highly
influential view of these developments has emerged which postulates that
race in science does not pose a threat because ‘the linkages of race,
biology, and medicine have taken very different shapes at different times’
and ‘they take very different forms as they are entwined with distinct
styles of thought about health, illness, and the body at different times
and places’.10 This is the view advanced by Nikolas Rose, who argues
that race has been reconceived in advanced liberal democracies in the
twenty-first century as a new biopolitics of identity emerges. The current
relationship between race and genetics, he argues,
is intrinsically linked to the delineation and administration of bioso-
cial communities, formed around beliefs in a shared disease heritage,
demanding resources for the biomedical research that might reveal
the genomic bases of these diseases, and mobilized by the hope of
a cure.11
For Rose, race has been integrated into the wider revolution in the politics
of identity that the new genomics has precipitated, where
the molecular rewriting of personhood in the age of genomics is
linked to the development of novel ‘life strategies’ for individuals
and their families, involving choice, enterprise, self-actualization,
and prudence in relation to one’s genetic makeup. And these
genetic practices of individuation provide new ways in which indi-
viduals are locating themselves within communities of obligation
and self-identification delineated by race.12
The question of whether race is in fact genetic (it clearly is not, as many
scientists and theorists – most recently John Dupre13 – have shown) is
less important to Rose than emphasising that it is the ‘active biological citi-
zens’14 of the twenty-first century who give new meanings to race as they
campaign for and consume various racialised genetic technologies, molecu-
lar biomedicine becoming ‘a new register of multiple hopes, and the site of
creation of new individual and collective identities and aspirations’.15
David Skinner also argues in this vein, claiming that both the use of
‘ethnic’ drugs and the desire to trace ancestry point to ‘the active involve-
ment of lay members of minorities in the developing of public discourse on
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science, race, ethnicity’.16 As such, for Skinner, ‘it will no longer be poss-
ible to dismiss discussion of biological differences between people as
racist’.17 In sum, race is neither wholly biological essence nor cultural con-
struct, but is the locus of increasingly complex intersections between
biology and culture:
race now signifies an unstable space of ambivalence between the mol-
ecular level of the genome and the cell, and the molar level of classi-
fications in terms of population group, country of origin, cultural
diversity and self-perception. It is in this new space of ambivalence
that a new genomic and molecular biopolitics of race, health and
life is taking shape.18
It is undeniable that the actions of the gene and its wider environment
and culture have become increasingly difficult to separate, as Evelyn Fox
Keller argues in The Mirage of a Space Between Nature and Nurture.19
Yet as the title of her book makes plain, this means that we must
abandon the nature–nurture, nature–culture dichotomies and any sense
of there being a ‘space’ between the two – which is precisely what Rose
argues for in locating race ambivalently in a space ‘between’ the biological
and the cultural. The spatial metaphor which underpins Rose’s claim that
race in science is made entirely new by the intervention of racial minorities,
leading to a non-deterministic race-based biosociality, is based on an out-
dated conception of ‘the gene’ and reveals the assumptions behind, and
ultimately pitfalls of, this thinking. His description of race as occupying
an ‘unstable space of ambivalence between’ recalls the conceptual frame-
work of hybridity, as it has been theorised and developed (from its histori-
cal origins in biology) in postcolonial studies. Homi Bhabha theorised
hybridity as being the product of colonialism, where discourses of colonial
power are disrupted and made ambivalent by the encounter with the cul-
tural difference of the colonised.20 For Bhabha, ‘Hybridity represents that
ambivalent “turn” of the discriminated subject into the terrifying, exorbi-
tant object of paranoid classification – a disturbing questioning of the
images and presences of authority.’21 He later developed hybridity to
refer to the fusion of cultures that results from ‘third world migration’:
‘the hybrid strategy’ is ‘a space of negotiation’ which is ‘neither assimilation
nor collaboration’ but in which hybrid agencies ‘deploy the partial culture
from which they emerge to construct visions of community . . . that give
narrative form to the minority positions they occupy; the outside of the
inside: the part in the whole’.22 The concept of hybridity thus came to
signify the unsettling of notions of essentialism and as such has been
highly influential, travelling beyond postcolonial studies where, as Pnina
Werbner has noted, ‘in the postmodern imaginary, hybridity invades
Josie Gill Epigenetics, race and The Satanic Verses
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whole areas of sociological discourse, subverting and conflating long-estab-
lished classes and categories’.23 It would appear that this is the function of
hybridity in Rose’s description of race as occupying ‘an unstable space of
ambivalence’: the hybrid framework conveys the breakdown and subver-
sion of the boundaries between biology and culture which Rose empha-
sises, providing the in-between, non-essential space in which to position
the new meaning of race.
However, the effect of this conceptual borrowing is that Rose’s theor-
isation of race in post-genomic biology reiterates, rather than challenges,
the tired focus on the politics of identity, at the expense of an engagement
with history, which has characterised postcolonial formations of hybridity.
Critics of theorisations of cultural hybridity have often pointed to the pri-
vileging of questions of identity in favour of an engagement with the social
and political struggles of the postcolonial subjects whose experience
‘hybridity’ is supposed to describe.24 The preoccupation with ambivalent
or in-between identities often only relates to the experiences of postcolonial
theorists and writers themselves – those with an ‘elevated perspective’25 or
‘the intellectual elite’.26 Similarly, the theorisations of Rose and Skinner
take little account of the fact that race is still experienced by the majority
of racialised peoples as a form of disadvantage, rather than a radical oppor-
tunity for expressing freedom and choice, or a way of ‘narrating and experi-
encing identity’.27 Rose bases his conclusions on examples such as the
collection of genetic data from African Americans by Howard University
(a private, Black university in the USA) or the consumption of racial ances-
try tracing technologies by African Americans (presumably the affluent
ones), yet for the majority of black Americans, the experience of race in
medicine and science is not a chance ‘to construe their selves and identities
partly in biomedical terms’.28 Racialised forms of medicine, far from pro-
viding targeted treatment, leave ‘room for much potential harm’29 as the
social and economic causes which can account for racial differences in
health are lost in the push to discover and define specifically genetic differ-
ences.30 The recent history of racism in biomedical science suggests that
caution is required,31 yet both Rose and Skinner repeatedly maintain
that race in science today is far removed from, and has little or no connec-
tion to racial science, decrying those who suggest possible connections as
being engaged in an outdated ‘sociocritique’.32
The result of this failure to take full account of the history of race in
science/racial science is that Rose’s evocation of race as a hybrid of the bio-
logical and the cultural ironically recalls the very history of race in science
which he so consciously seeks to avoid. The celebration of identity in post-
colonial formations of hybridity has often occurred at the expense of a con-
sideration of the history of the term: the concept of hybridity was
employed by nineteenth-century racial scientists to describe racial mixing
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and became central to debates about whether different races were different
species, the test for different species being whether the progeny would be
infertile, a charge often levelled at mixed race populations in the colonies.33
The lack of attention paid to this racialised history has resulted, as several
scholars have shown, in the repetition of ideas and structures from past
racialised discourses in contemporary theorisations of hybridity.34 For
Robert J.C. Young
The question is whether the old, essentializing categories of cultural
identity, or of race, were really so essentialized, or have been retro-
spectively constructed as more fixed than they were. When we look
at the texts of racial theory, we find that they are in fact contradictory,
disruptive and already deconstructed . . . in deconstructing such
essentialist notions of race today we may rather be repeating the
past than distancing ourselves from it or providing a critique of it.35
Rose claims that whereas race in the nineteenth-century was understood at
the molar level – in terms of visible, physical characteristics – the ‘molecu-
lar gaze of contemporary genomics transforms this perception’, creating a
complexity which is simply not deterministic in the way that racial science
was.36 While the mechanics of measuring race might have changed, Rose’s
claim does not take account of the fact that race (in science) has never been
wholly deterministic, essentialised or biologised. For example, Sarah
Winter, noting the arguments of sociologists such as Rose, has shown
how Darwin called into question ‘the dominant tradition of typological
classification that ranked animals and humans qualitatively on the basis
of their differences in physical appearance’ and instead revealed ‘the inco-
herence of race as a deterministic category with a fixed biological meaning’
in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, a theory which
Winter argues might offer methodological insights for post-genomic
biology.37 In a similar manner to the repetition of the ‘already decon-
structed’ discourses of racial theory in postcolonial theorisations of hybrid-
ity, Rose’s characterisation of race as occupying an ‘unstable space of
ambivalence’, hovering uncertainly between biology and culture, reiterates
the ambivalence of race in nineteenth-century science, an ambivalence
built into the concept of hybridity from its inception in racial science.
Far from providing a new, radical framework for conceiving of race and
its relationship to the biosciences, the hybrid model of an ambivalent in-
between race risks having the same impact as older discourses on race
where ‘the ambiguities, contradictions and discrepancies manifest within
particular racial theories and racialised medicine are more likely to
strengthen than weaken racial discourses’.38
Josie Gill Epigenetics, race and The Satanic Verses
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How, then, can we conceive of the relationship between race and
biology in a way which recognises the complex interaction of biology
and culture but resists the artificial separation of the two?; a way which
recognises that there are no ‘genes for’ race, but accounts for the history
of racism as well as contemporary experiences of racial inequality?
Recent developments in the burgeoning science of epigenetics may
provide the answer. Epigenetics, in its broadest sense, is concerned with
the interaction of genes and environment. It is the study of the process
by which the chemicals and proteins within DNA are modified, through
methylation and histone modification, affecting gene expression, but not
the fixed sequence of DNA. The discovery which has forced scientists to
reconsider their long held assumptions is that epigenetic marks can be
switched on or off according to the environmental conditions in which
the body finds itself, and that such changes can be inherited by offspring
and passed from generation to generation.39 For Tim Spector, Professor
of Twin Research and Genetic Epidemiology, epigenetics challenges four
fundamental assumptions that have governed genetic science: that genes
singlehandedly define the essence of human beings and are the only mech-
anism of inheritance; that genes and heritable genetic destiny cannot be
changed or modified; that an environmental event cannot produce a
long lasting influence on your genes; and that you cannot inherit the
effects of your ancestors’ environments.40 The more familiar linear
model of development and inheritance in which genes are fixed for life
and passed on unchanged has thus been fundamentally challenged by
the newly revealed complexity of gene and environment interaction. The
study of epigenetic mechanisms reveals that the human body’s genetic
structures can change and change back, that the body is in a dynamic
relationship with its environment, that culture can become embodied.
The initial findings of epigenetic studies have far-reaching impli-
cations for race in science. Rather than consolidating racial categorisations,
or fixing race as a deterministic essence, epigenetics reveals how race as
experience influences genetic development and inheritance. A study by
Grazyna Jasienska has suggested that the lower birth weight of African-
American babies in comparison with the birth weight of European Amer-
icans is attributable not only to contemporary socio-economic inequalities,
but to the conditions experienced during slavery, the effects of which have
been passed through generations via epigenetic processes.41 Jasienska
argues that while difference in socio-economic status does account for
some racial differences in birth characteristics, it does not account for
the significant differences in the weight of newborns between black and
white women on low incomes or, within black populations, between the
babies of black women born in African countries living in the USA and
black women born in the USA.42 Jasienska suggests that the difference
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can be explained by the ‘influence of intergenerational life conditions,
especially for the female line’ which for African Americans comprises the
‘inadequate diet and strenuous workload’ of slave populations who ‘experi-
enced an imbalance between energy intake and energy expenditure, and
had high energetic costs of fighting infectious diseases’.43 The low birth
weight of African-American children is thus partly the result of the low
weight of slave children, the low rate of childhood growth as a result of
poor nutrition and intense labor from a young age experienced by slaves,
and the fact that slave mothers and grandmothers had poor nutritional
development during adult life.44 The experiences of ancestors become
embodied in health disparities in the present, the genes carrying a
‘memory’ of these experiences, while the genes also create new memories
as they are affected by the psychosocial stresses of racism in the present.
Indeed, other studies have focused on the environmental influences on
the genes which occur during the lifetime of an individual as the cause of
racial differences in health outcomes. Kuzawa and Sweet, studying the US
black-white disparity in cardiovascular disease, suggest that
there is now a strong rationale to consider developmental and epige-
netic mechanisms as links between early life environmental factors
like maternal stress during pregnancy and adult race-based health
disparities in diseases like hypertension, diabetes, stroke and coron-
ary heart disease.45
Racial differences in rates of cardiovascular disease are explained by the fact
that lower birth weights in African Americans are related to higher blood
pressure in later life, and that lower birth weights are caused by maternal
stressors and the passage of stress hormones across the placenta, which
are, in turn, caused by psychosocial stress, depression, exposure to racial
discrimination and residential segregation.46 What these studies of epige-
netic processes show is that race becomes a fluid, complex combination
of the influence on the genes of an individual’s current environment and
the environment of their ancestors. Racism has biological effects which
in turn create racial disparities in health; rather than biologising social defi-
nitions of race, race is revealed as a social construct with biological
consequences.
Epigenetics might thus provide a radical opportunity for the re-think-
ing of race, enabling a much needed reassertion of the importance of both
historical and contemporary forms of racial discrimination, factors often
excluded from identity-focused theorisations of the indeterminism of
race in the biosciences such as that put forward by Rose. Epigenetic mech-
anisms reveal not only the fictiveness of the nature–culture binary, but the
impossibility of there being an ambivalent space between the two; they do
Josie Gill Epigenetics, race and The Satanic Verses
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not show that culture has a more significant influence on inheritance and
development than the gene, but that such distinctions no longer have any
meaning. Fox Keller, for whom emerging descriptions of epigenetics are in
fact in danger of reiterating the meaningless question ‘how much of our
behavior is driven by our genes versus the environments in which we
grow up and live’, contends that it is a case of understanding that ‘the
gene’ cannot be a discrete entity because it has no meaning in the
absence of its opposite;
What is the causal role of a gene in the absence of environment?
None is clearly the answer. Absent environmental factors, genes
have no more power to shape the development of an individual
than do environmental factors in the absence of genes.47
Instead, she argues, it is the ‘cellular complex’ around the gene which ‘not
only reads, translates, and interprets that sequence, but also defines it’ and
makes any sense of a gene/environment binary obsolete:
not only is it a mistake to think of development in terms of separable
causes, but it is also a mistake to think of the development of traits as
a product of causal elements interacting with one another. Indeed,
the notion of interaction presupposes the existence of entities that
are at least ideally separable – i.e., it presupposes an a priori space
between component entities – and this is precisely what the character
of developmental dynamics precludes. Everything we know about
the processes of inheritance and development teaches us that the
entanglement of developmental processes is not only immensely
intricate, but it is there from the start.48
The epistemological contribution of epigenetics to debates about genetic
inheritance and development is precisely this illumination of the ‘entangle-
ment’ of processes, which makes clear that the nature–culture, nature–
nurture, biology–culture models which have persisted into the twenty-
first century have lost meaning. Although Keller contends that ‘we scarcely
need the new science of genomics and epigenetics to teach us this lesson’,49
in the face of the continuing conceptual separation of the environmental
and the biological when it comes to race, epigenetics offers a salient reas-
sessment of the assumptions which continue to govern dominant scientific
and sociological thinking about the meaning of race.
The novel findings of epigenetics have begun to emerge into the
public domain and, as has been the case with previous genetic break-
throughs such as the Human Genome Project, literary analogies and allu-
sions have been employed to communicate this science. In the introduction
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to her popular science book The Epigenetics Revolution Nessa Carey com-
pares DNA to a script, asking her readers to think of the way cells read
genetic code as different film versions of Romeo and Juliet, stating that
‘the same script can result in different productions’.50 Tim Spector refer-
ences Rudyard Kipling’s Just So Stories – fantastic tales of how various
animals came to obtain their physical characteristics through human or
environmental intervention – in the leopard print design of his book’s
dust jacket. The use of such literary references can have a profound
effect on the way genetic science comes to be understood by the
public,51 however, I want to suggest that literary precursors to epigenetic
ideas might play a wider and more complex role in how that science is com-
prehended. Rather than simply providing convenient analogies which ease
the passage of scientific communication, literature can offer ways of think-
ing through the emerging issues from epigenetic science. In what follows I
explore Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses as an example of how fiction
might enhance understanding of the impact of historical and contempor-
ary racisms on the body, something that epigenetic science is only now
beginning to uncover.
Rushdie has become increasingly interested in biological science and
its relationship to fiction. In 2009, the twentieth anniversary of the
fatwa against his life, Rushdie became a member of the advisory board
of Project Reason, a not-for-profit organisation set up with the purpose
of ‘spreading scientific knowledge and secular values in society’.52 The
project, whose board members include writers Ian McEwan and Ayann
Hirsi Ali, as well as several prominent contemporary biologists and geneti-
cists including Richard Dawkins, Steven Pinker and Craig Venter, brings
together thinkers from the literary and scientific worlds who share the
belief that rational thinking, science and secularism need to be asserted
in the face of the irrationality and fundamentalism of religious belief.
Rushdie’s involvement is perhaps not surprising given his increasing par-
ticipation in public debates about Islam following the terrorist attacks of
9/11 and 7 July 2005, debates which have often sought to construct
Islamic belief as a pre-modern dogma irreconcilable with the West
which, in contrast, is heralded as the embodiment of rational, progressive
thought.53 Yet what Project Reason adds to the debate, and makes explicit,
is the specifically scientific character of the reason it promotes; the project
places biological science and evolutionary theory at the centre of its
response to religious belief, as the ultimate answer to it. Rushdie has
increasingly adopted the logic of evolutionary biology as means of explain-
ing –and defending – storytelling, as a way of foreclosing objections to lit-
erary expression, such as those put forward by some Muslims following the
publication of The Satanic Verses. In recent interviews, Rushdie claims that
the ‘story instinct is hardwired in our DNA’54 and that ‘any external
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limitations on our ability to speak, or on the content of our speech, there-
fore, interferes with something essential to us all, whether we are writers or
not’.55 Stressing the innateness and universality of storytelling through a
Darwinian framework in which we are all ‘story-telling animals’,56
Rushdie appears to align himself with the evolutionary explanations of lit-
erature to be found in sociobiology and the Literary Darwinist movement.
In this context it might seem unlikely that Rushdie’s writing could
engage with the fluidity and non-deterministic findings of epigenetics –
the opposite of the deterministic world-view which characterises neo-Dar-
winian approaches to biology and literature. Yet as several critics have
noted, Rushdie’s non-fictional writing and journalism are consistently
more polemical than his fiction, the ideological clarity of the former at
odds with the more ambivalent, contradictory character of the latter.57
Moreover there has been a ‘profound ideological shift’58 in Rushdie’s
thinking, which began with the fatwa against him in 1989, but was cemen-
ted by the events of 9/11.59 Indeed, Rushdie’s engagement with evolution-
ary biology prior to this ‘shift’, in The Satanic Verses itself, is of a more
complex kind than the Darwinian view he would later come to adopt.
The Satanic Verses is a tale of the experiences of immigrants in Britain
under Thatcher and follows the lives of two Indian immigrants, Saladin
Chamcha and Gibreel Farishta, as they struggle to make their way in
London following their abrupt arrival in England: the novel opens with
Saladin and Gibreel falling to earth from their exploded jumbo jet
which has been hijacked by terrorists. On the plane, Saladin encounters
American creationist Eugene Dumsday who explains to Chamcha that
he has been
warning your fellow men . . . against Mr Darwin and his works. With
the assistance of my personal fifty-seven slide presentation. I spoke of
my own country, of its young people . . . I see them in their despair,
turning to narcotics . . . If I believed that my great-granddaddy was a
chimpanzee, why, I’d be pretty depressed myself.60
As his name suggests, Dumsday is dumb, and his blinkered religious fun-
damentalism can only be laughed at – Chamcha’s response is to ‘giggle’
(p. 77) – and Dumsday’s sermonising is comically undermined when
later in the novel Chamcha hears him on the radio and he now embodies
the things which he abhors; the devil (having ‘lost the half of his tongue’
(p. 418) in the hijacking incident) and modern biological science, which
has enabled his tongue to be rebuilt ‘with flesh taken from his posterior’
(p. 418).
Rushdie’s scepticism toward the kinds of religious fundamentalism
which deny Darwinian evolution is clear, yet the novel resists taking its
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own fundamentalist stance toward biology and instead draws upon a pre-
Darwinian theory of evolution as a metaphor for one of its foremost
themes – the condition of migrancy. As Saladin and Gibreel fall
through the sky they encounter ‘the debris of the soul, broken memories,
sloughed-off selves, severed mother-tongues, violated privacies, untransla-
table jokes, extinguished futures, lost loves, the forgotten meaning of
hollow, booming words, land, belonging, home’ (p. 4). These are the
changes wrought on the individual by migration, Rushdie suggests, and
to emphasise their force, such changes are depicted as being manifested
in a physical change in the body of the migrant. Saladin and Gibreel meta-
morphose as they fall, the ‘processes of their transmutation’ (p. 5) playfully
explained by the narrator through reference to the early nineteenth-century
botanist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck:
Mutation?
Yessir, but not random. Up there in air-space, in that soft, impercep-
tible field which had been made possible by the century and which,
thereafter, made the century possible, becoming one of its defining
locations, the place of movement and of war, the planet- shrinker
and power-vacuum, most insecure and transitory of zones, illusory,
discontinuous, metamorphic, – because when you throw everything
up in the air anything becomes possible – wayupthere, at any rate,
changes took place in delirious actors that would have gladdened
the heart of old Mr Lamarck: under extreme environmental pressure,
characteristics were acquired. (p. 5)
Lamarck’s thesis, set out in his 1809 Philosophie Zoologique, was that it was
possible for organisms to acquire physical characteristics during their life-
times, which were then inherited by their offspring.61 It was a controversial
theory which was invoked throughout the nineteenth century but which
enjoyed a significant resurgence during the debates that followed
Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859.62 The idea that environmentally
acquired characteristics might be passed on genetically was, after dominat-
ing debates for several decades, ultimately laid to rest with the Modern
Evolutionary Synthesis in the 1940s when Darwinian natural selection
became the basis of modern genetic science. However the transgenerational
responses identified by recent epigenetic studies have led some to conclude
that Lamarck was, in fact, partially right.63
Rushdie comically invokes Lamarckian evolution as the magical
science which explains the immigrants’ equally magical transmutation by
migration; yet as the novel progresses it becomes apparent that it is the
socially and culturally hostile environment of England which dictates
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the nature of the characteristics which the immigrants go on to acquire.
Picked up by the police and immigration officers, who abuse him in the
back of their van, dragging off his clothes, beating him, and making him
eat his own excrement, Saladin becomes the ‘animal’ (p. 159) they call
him, growing horns, hairy thighs and hoofs, ‘squealing like a pig’
(p. 161) before being beaten unconscious. Saladin’s literal dehumanisation
is a direct result of the racism to which he is subject, and he is taken to the
medical facility at the detention centre where he is surrounded by other
immigrants who, the manticore in the bed next to him explains, have
undergone similar transformations;
‘There’s a woman over that way,’ it said, ‘who is now mostly water-
buffalo. There are businessmen from Nigeria who have grown sturdy
tails. There is a group of holidaymakers from Senegal who were
doing no more than changing planes when they were turned into
slippery snakes’ (p. 168).
The experience of racism manifests itself in physical, bodily changes which
the immigrants themselves can hardly believe are true: in the face of the
impossible, Saladin is forced to constantly remind himself that ‘he was a
member of the real world’ (p. 74), that ‘I am a real man’ (p. 135), and
is particularly confounded by the fact that the police officers who abuse
him are not alarmed by his mutation;
What puzzled Chamcha was that a circumstance which struck him as
utterly bewildering and unprecedented – that is, his metamorphosis
into this supernatural imp – was being treated by the others as if it
were the most banal and familiar matter they could imagine. (p. 158)
Yet the police officers are not surprised by Saladin’s appearance because
for them it is not unreal or impossible; they see immigrants as animals
and as less than human, and that becomes their reality. The enduring
effect of racism is to make the imaginary real, as Saladin finally discovers
in hospital, ‘“They describe us,” the other whispered solemnly. “That’s
all. They have the power of description, and we succumb to the pictures
they construct.”’ (p. 168).
Rushdie’s insistence that it is racism which creates the racial other,
whose difference is constructed and made rather than biologically fixed
or inherited, has clear parallels with the conclusions of epigenetic studies
which recognise seemingly racial characteristics as the biological embodi-
ment of cultural and environmental circumstances. Rushdie’s represen-
tation of these processes, however, is of course ‘unrealistic’: changes to
genetic structures are not the same as physical human–animal
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metamorphosis. The question is thus what value such a magical-realist fic-
tional representation can have for how we think about epigenetics; can such
fantastical depictions of humanity shed any light on a scientific (epigenetic)
understanding of life? A similar question is posed by Ian McEwan in his
2005 novel Saturday, in which the novel’s neuroscientist protagonist,
Henry Perowne, questions the efficacy of the magical-realist style of con-
temporary writers, including Rushdie:
What were these authors of reputation doing—grown men and
women of the twentieth century—granting supernatural powers to
their characters? He never made it all the way through a single one
of those irksome confections. And written for adults, not children.
In more than one, heroes and heroines were born with or sprouted
wings . . . Others were granted a magical sense of smell, or tumbled
unharmed out of high-flying aircraft.64
Perowne objects to fictions such as The Satanic Verses because they are not
grounded in a ‘recognizable physical reality’, their magical or supernatural
forms evidence, in Perowne’s view, of an ‘insufficient imagination’ because
‘the actual, not the magical, should be the challenge’ (p. 67). However
what The Satanic Verses works to show is precisely that the actual and
the magical are not as easily as separable as Perowne imagines them to
be. The value of Rushdie’s magical representation of race and Lamarckian
evolution lies in its very ability to reveal the dynamic relationship between
the imaginary and the real; the immigrants’ unprecedented animalistic
transformations work to show the arbitrariness, absurdity, but also the ulti-
mate power of the racist belief which shapes their reality. In the context of
epigenetics, the novel’s magical realism enables us to think of the relation-
ship between environment and physiological responses as the imaginary
(slave owners’ belief in the racial inferiority of their slaves) made real (in
health disparities in the present). Rushdie’s depiction of race thus high-
lights what is latent in emerging epigenetic studies, namely, that race is
no more than a powerful fiction made real by racism.
Writing on the relationship between science and literature in McEwan’s
Saturday, David Amigoni argues that the novel poses the question, in the face
of Perowne’s evident scientific expertise and skills, ‘what does literature do,
how does it speak within a culture saturated by genetic science?’65 and
begins to answer it in Perowne’s diagnosis of the criminal Baxter, where
Perowne exploits ‘not the metaphysical, but indeed the magical thinking
that hovers below the metaphysical justification of the patient-doctor relation-
ship’.66 It is the ability of literature to reveal and make space for such magical
thinking as one of the ‘varied meanings’ of ‘the gene’ which, for Amigoni,
shows ‘what literature can do’.67 Although Rushdie, unlike McEwan, does
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not address the ‘culture of genetics’ directly in The Satanic Verses, the novel
similarly reveals what fiction ‘can do’ in an epigenetic culture: Rushdie’s fan-
tastical imaginings demonstrate that the imagined must be acknowledged,
accounted for, and ultimately accepted as part of ‘the real’ in a science
which itself was not long ago considered ‘magical’. Put differently, Rushdie’s
novel demonstrates that the imagined – fiction – is capable not only of
exploring but of informing a scientific reality which is constantly changing
and incorporating what was previously unreal. As epigenetic studies continue
to uncover the biological effects of the experience of racism, fictions such as
The Satanic Verses offer a salient reminder of the ‘power of description’, be
it in the racist thought of slave owners or indeed in fictional works, in
shaping the environments in which we live.
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